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THE TRIAL JUDGE'S GtUJ)E TO NEWS REPORTING AND FAIR TRIAL
BERNARD S. MEYER
The author has been a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York since 1959. He is pres-
ently serving as Vice-Chairman of the National Conference of State Trial Judges and as Chairman
of the Conference's Special Committee on NewsReporting and Fair Trial. Justice Meyer was a member
of the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press (Reardon Committee) to the AmericanBar
Association Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice.
He has written numerous articles on the subject of this paper, and participated in many seminars and
conferences concerning the issues raised herein. Justice Meyer was a participant in the 1962 Confer-
ence on Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases, conducted by Northwestern University School
of Law and the Medill School of Journalism (Northwestern University).
As its title clearly implies, this article is intended as a guide for trial judges confronted by free press-
fair trial dilemmas in actual practice. Justice Meyer describes the trial process from the pre-arraign-
ment point to ultimate conclusion of the trial, with emphasis on those types of free press-fair trial
problems a trial judge may expect to have to deal with at each stage of the proceedings. The author
suggests alternatives to assure both the prosecution and the defendant a fair trial. Prerequisite to the
effectiveness of any specific orders issued by a trial judge in a publicized case, however, will be the
judge's communication to those concerned as to what, in his opinion, justice demands their respec-
tive roles should be. Only when each side understands the needs and rights of the other will each side
respect and try not to infringe thereon. Justice Meyer stresses that each case involving appreciable
amounts of publicity is in a class by itself, and cautions judges to frame appropriate orders inparticular
cases rather than attempting to adopt orders entered by other judges in other cases.
The contents of this article also appear, in substance, as a chapter in the second edition of the
State Trial Judge's Book, published under the sponsorship of the National Conference of State
Trial Judges.
One of the vexing problems for a judge handling
a criminal trial, especially if a public figure is in-
volved or there are bizarre aspects to the crime, is
the effect of news reporting, whether in print or
by broadcast media, upon the fairness of the trial.
Whether such publicity in fact prejudices jurors
has never been scientifically proven or disproven,
though the matter is presently under study. A
trial may, however, involve "such a probability
that prejudice will result that it is deemed in-
herently lacking in due process." 1 The trial
judge's responsibility to protect a defendant
against such a probability of prejudice requires
not only that he guard against any act or utter-
ance on his own part that may tend to interfere
with the right of the people or of the defendant to
I Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542 (1965).
a fair trial, but also that he act on his own motion
to control influences that disturb the impartiality
and judicial serenity of the trial. At the same time
he can never lose sight of the role of the media to
guard "against the miscarriage of justice by sub-
jecting thepolice, prosecutors, and judicialprocesses
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 2
The delicate balance thus to be maintained be-
tween freedom of the press and the right to a fair
trial requires understanding by the media of the
rules of evidence and of substantive law governing
the particular trial, and by the bench and bar of
the purposes and problems of the media. For the
individual judge this means development of an
understanding and cooperative attitude toward
the media, not, of course, to the point of revealing
2Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
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what should not be revealed, but for the purpose
of educating newsmen concerning legal rules and
procedures and of learning from them the practical
problems which beset them so that intelligent and
intelligible procedures and orders relating to news
coverage of a particular trial can be developed.
Cooperation between bench and media, when each
understands the responsibilities of the other, can
provide a more complete answer to the problem of
potentially prejudicial publicity than can orders or
regulations. To deal generally with such matters,
there have been established in a number of states,
and there are in process of formation in a number
of others, organizations variously known as Con-
ferences, Councils or Committees, composed of
representatives of both media and bar associa-
tions, judges, and law enforcement officials. Many
such "Bar-Press" committees have adopted State-
ments of Principles and Guidelines concerning
when publication of specific kinds of information
should be delayed in order to assure a defendant a
fair trial. Some such committees have developed
cooperation to the fine point of establishing a Re-
view Committee to which troublesome problems
or guideline "infringements" are referred. A trial
judge handling a sensational criminal trial should,
therefore, first ascertain whether such a committee
exists in his state, what principles and guidelines
it has adopted, and what interpretations and
applications of the guidelines have been made.
Other fertile sources of assistance and informa-
tion are the Standards Relating to Fair Trial and
Free Press approved by the American Bar Asso-
ciation House of Delegates on February 19, 1968,
similar standards recommended by other state and
local bar groups (e.g., the report of the Special
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, known as the Medina Com-
mittee), the standards adopted September 19,
1968, by the Judicial Conference of the United
States,8 the Regulations issued by the Attorney
General of the United States,4 and for juvenile
court judges, the booklet published by the Na-
tional Council on Crime and Delinquency entitled
"Guides for Juvenile Court Judges on News Media
Relations." The ABA Standards are reprinted in
the American Bar Association Journal' and can
also be obtained in reprint form from the ABA
Publications Office. A valuable adjunct to the
3 Reported in full in the CoNGlssloNMA. REcoRD of
Oct. 11, 1968, at S-12639-46.
4 28 C.F.R. 50.2, the so-called "Katzenbach order."
5 54 A.B.AJ. 347-51.
ABA Standards is the extensive commentary on the
law which is set forth in the Tentative Draft of
the Standards issued in December, 1966, and the
commentary, explanatory of the revisions made,
which appears in the Approved Draft of the
Standards issued in March, 1968.
Basic to all of the standards, of course, are the
decisions of the federal and state courts, and par-
ticularly the Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard
v. Maxwel.6 It is upon the Sheppard decision and
the ABA Standards that the material which follows
is largely based.
THE PRE-ARRAIGNmNT STAGE
Where lies the authority to control disruptive
influences at this stage is the first question that
must be answered. The question has two aspects:
(1) at what stage does judicial jurisdiction com-
mence, and (2) what court should act.
The first is an issue of separation of powers. The
Sheppard decision is equivocal on the point, stating
that "the court should have made some effort to
control the release of leads, information and
gossip to the press by police officers, .. ." and that
"the judge should have further sought to alleviate
this problem by imposing control over the state-
ments made to the news media by ... especially
the Coroner and police officers", but also that
"the court could also have requested the appro-
priate city and county officials to promulgate a
regulation with respect to dissemination of infor-
mation about the case by their employees" and
that "... enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should [not] be permitted
to frustrate its function." 7 The ABA Tentative
Draft presents the arguments supporting con-
stitutionality of court orders regulating law
enforcement officials,. the Medina Report9 states
the contrary arguments. The United States
Judicial Conference found it unnecessary to take
any position on the issue because it appeared to be
covered adequately by regulations issued by the
Attorney General,10 and the ABA Final Draft left
the matter to regulation by law enforcement
officials in the first instance, with the recommenda-
tion that if such agencies had not within a reason-
able time adopted such a regulation, it should be
made effective by court rule or legislation. It must,
6 Supra note 2.
7Id. at 359-60, 362-63.
8 At 101-06.
9 At 39-44.10Supra note 4.
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of course, be recognized that the question may
involve interpretation of state, as well as federal,
constitutional provisions. Trial judges should
encourage law enforcement agencies to adopt
regulations of the type specified in 2.1 of the
ABA Standards, and failing that should seek
court rules or legislation as suggested. Moreover,
before any trial judge seeks in an individual case
to control the release of information by law en-
forcement officials at the prearraignment or
preindictment stage, he should be satisfied (1)
that neither federal nor state constitutional law
proscribes his so doing,' (2) that the matter has
not been dealt with adequately by regulation of
the law enforcement agency or cannot be dealt
with adequately by request to the executive
(governor, county executive, mayor) of whose
administration the law enforcement agency is a
part, and (3) that the probability of prejudice to
the accused is of such proportion that available
correctives (continuance, change of venue) cannot
reasonably be expected to establish a proper
climate for the trial. If those three conditions are
met, however, a trial judge should act, even at the
prearraignment stage, to prevent prejudicial acts
or statements by law enforcement officials.
Which judge should act at the prearraignnent
stage is a matter not of constitutional but of local
procedural law. When the same court that will
try the case sits on arraignment, or will receive
the information or indictment, there is no problem.
But most of the cases in which publicity is likely
to become a problem will involve felonies, and in
many states the court which tries felonies has no
jurisdiction until the indictment is presented or an
information filed, the initial arraignment of the
accused being before another court. Absent a rule
of the state's highest judicial authority, joint rules
of the trial and arraigning courts, or legislation
dealing with the problem, such control of the
release of information by law enforcement officials
as is to be exercised by the judiciary at this stage
is in the hands of the arraigning court.
What has been written above with respect to
law enforcement officials applies not only to police
1 Of interest in this connection is Younger v. Superior
Court, 393 U. S. 1001 (1969). Petitioner, the Los An-
geles District Attorney, seeking to have vacated the
order re publicity made in the Sirhan case, argued that
the order was in excess of the court's juridsiction. Pe-
tition for Certiorari, pp. 23-27. His application was
denied without opinion by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of California, and certiorari was
denied by the United States Supreme Court.
officers, but also to the coroner or medical examiner
and his staff, and other investigative or custodial
personnel employed by government offices outside
the judicial system. Judicial employees and law-
yers, prosecution or defense, are, of course, re-
sponsible to the courts during the prearraignment
period as well as at all other times. Where regula-
tions governing judicial employees have not been
adoptedu and the necessity for direction to them
during the prearraignment stage becomes ap-
parent, a trial judge need have no hesitancy about
issuing a specific order. The Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics contain specific provisions concerning
statements by lawyers during the prearraignment
period." Where the Canons have been adopted, or
a similar rule of court is in force, a lawyer who
acts in violation of the Canon or rule is subject to
disciplinary action without the issuance of any
order. Only in extreme cases, therefore, where
contempt proceedings against a lawyer appear
warranted will there be necessity for a specific
order directed to lawyers during the pre-arraign-
ment period.
It is emphasized that not every extrajudicial
statement made by a lawyer, judicial employee,
law enforcement or other governmental officer is
prejudicial and that even prejudicial information
may be disclosed when necessary to aid in an
investigation, assist in the apprehension of a
suspect, or warn the public of any dangers. Specifi-
cation of information that should not be released
and of statements which it is appropriate to make
during the pendency of a criminal matter are set
forth in s 1.1 and 2.1 of the ABA Standards.
While the specifications in those paragraphs are
neither all inclusive nor mutually exclusive, they
cover all of the situations that will normally arise,
and may be used as guidelines for any order a
trial judge decides it is appropriate to issue.
Indeed, once the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility incorporating the substance of 1.1 has
been adopted in a particular state, a trial judge in
that state may well content himself, with respect
to that part of any order relating to lawyers that
he decides to issue, with the incorporation by
reference in his order of that portion of the Code.
12 See ABA STANnD 2.3.
13 ABA STNDARDm I1.1 proposed a detailed revision
of the Canons of Professional Ethics. The substance of
that proposed revision was incorporated in Disciplinary
Rule 7-107 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
adopted by the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards, which is to be presented to the
ABA House of Delegates for adoption in August, 1969.
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Among the announcements deemed appropriate
to make during this stage of the proceeding is a
description of physical evidence seized. To the
extent necessary to protect against improper
release of exhibits containing any confession,
admission or statement, the trial or arraigning
judge may, subject to the separation of powers
question discussed above, make an order impound-
ing specified exhibits and proscribing the taking of
any photographs of them except by the state or,
when authorized by court order, by the defendant.
Under the circumstances of a given case, where
there is no departmental regulation covering the
posing of an accused for photographs or television
or the granting of interviews to newsmen by a
person in custody,14 a trial judge may find it
necessary at this stage to issue an order prohibiting
such posing or interviews, unless the accused
consents in writing after being informed of his
right to consult with counsel about the matter and
to refuse to grant an interview.
Tim POsT-ARmAIGNMENT AND PRxE-TR STAGE
Everything stated above with respect to extra
judicial statements, and the photographing and
interviewing of the accused applies as well to the
postarraignment period, the only differences
being that there is less of a question concerning
separation of powers, the matter then being
pending before the court, and that the court
before which the matter is pending is known, thus
obviating any question of jurisdiction as between
courts.
Pretrial Hearings
Whether evidence was illegally obtained,
whether an identification was made under such
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances as to
make in-court identification excludable, whether a
confession was voluntarily made, are all questions
which must be determined, at least in the first
instance, out of the presence of the jury. As the
Supreme Court recognized in the Sheppard case,"5
"exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered
meaningless when news media make it available to
the public." Though the Court stated that "...
reporters who wrote or broadcast prejudicial
stories, could have been warned as to the impro-
priety of publishing material not introduced in the
14 See ABA STANDAR 2.1(b).
15 Supra note 2, at 360.
proceedings," 16 it also reiterated that what
transpires in the courtroom is public property. If
the media are free to print all that transpires in
open court during a suppression, confession or
identification hearing, an exclusionary ruling will
be worse than meaningless, indeed will be a trap
for the defendant, unless the hearing is dosed to
the public, including representatives of the news
media, or unless the hearing is deferred until after
the jury has been selected and sequestered.
Too often overlooked as a possible solution to
the problem presented by the pretrial exclusionary
hearing is the expedient of deferring the hearing
until after sequestration. Doing so will permit the
news media to report all that transpires at the
hearing, since the jury will then be isolated from
their reports. This may present practical problems
(1) because counsel will have less time for prepara-
tion after suppression has been granted or denied
than they would have had had a pretrial hearing
been held, and (2) because the jurors must endure
the strictures of sequestration. Such considerations
must be balanced in deciding when an exclusionary
hearing should be held, but it should not be
presumed, simply because the request is made
prior to trial, that the hearing must be held
pretrial.
When, after consideration, it is concluded that a
pretrial hearing is to be held, exclusion of media
representatives as well as the general public is
essential because, notwithstanding the power and
duty of the trial judge to warn concerning the
impropriety of publishing evidence presented at
such a hearing, and notwithstanding the willing-
ness of some reporters to withhold, until comple-
tion of the trial, prejudicial information disclosed
at such a hearing, not all reporters are willing to
do so, and there is serious doubt whether a re-
porter's violation of an agreement to delay publi-
cation constitutes contempt. 7 Moreover, the only
correctives for a violation are change of venue or
continuance. To seek the first, the defendant must
give up his constitutional right to a trial by a
jury of the state and district where the crime was
committed; to seek the second, he must give up
his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
In addition to the exclusionary hearings so far
discussed, there may be a preliminary hearing
concerning probable cause or for the purpose of
1 Id. at 362.
"7See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); Azbill v.
Fisher, 84 Nev. 414,442 P.2d 916 (1968).
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fixing bail. Such hearings do not necessarily
involve evidence that may be excluded at the trial
and it, therefore, cannot be said, as it can with
respect to exclusionary hearings, that every such
hearing should be dosed upon defendant's request.
With respect to a preliminary or bail hearing, a
motion that the hearing be dosed should, how-
ever, be granted unless the judge determines that
there is no substantial likelihood of interference
with defendant's right to a fair trial by an im-
partial jury.
Of course, all that has been said about dosed
hearings assumes that the defendant has either
moved that the hearing be closed or consented to
the suggestion of the court or the prosecution to
that effect. This is because the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution guarantees
"the accused ... the right to a speedy and public
trial," which may well encompass pretrial hearings
as well as the trial itself.
Although the federal constitutional right is a
right of the accused and not of the public, some
state constitutional and statutory provisions have
been construed to require that trials be public
notwithstanding defendant's consent to closure.18
But if it is a constitutional absolute that what
transpires in open court is public property and
may be immediately disseminated, and it is also a
constitutional requirement that the admissibility
of certain types of evidence be determined outside
the presence of the jury, then it may well be that
a state constitutional or statutory provision that
is so construed is itself in violation of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee to the accused of trial
"by an impartial jury." 19 A trial judge in a state
whose constitution is so construed should, there-
fore, carefully consider all aspects of the problem
(including the possibility of deferring the hearing
until the jury has been sequestered) and the
effectiveness of available correctives, before ruling
on a defendant's motion that a pretrial hearing be
dosed, and in ruling should make specific findings
with respect to the likelihood of interference with
defendant's right to a fair trial.
18 Compare E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio
App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, 1955 appeal dismissed as
m;wot, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955), with
United Press Ass'n v. Valenti, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d
777 (1954), and Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.
App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); and note that the
mandamus issued in Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior
Court, 68 Cal. Rprt. 83 (1968), was vacated and the
proceeding dismissed as moot by the California Supreme
Court' 261 Cal. App. 2d 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968).19 Cf. Azbill v. Fisher, szpra note 17.
Whenever it is determined that a hearing should
be dosed, court personnel and the parties, at-
torneys and witnesses participating in the hearing
should be directed, on the record, not to disclose
what transpired at the hearing until the case is
completed by verdict or other disposition.
Though a trial judge concludes that in a given
case a dosed pretrial hearing must be held, he
should be alert to the role of the media to scruti-
nize law enforcement and judicial processes to
protect the public interest in the integrity of those
processes. That role and that interest he should
protect by requiring (1) that a complete record be
made, (2) that the trial itself be held as soon as
possible after the pretrial hearing so that there be
no undue delay in publication, and (3) that the
record of the hearing be made available to the
public, and media representatives notified of that
fact, promptly after completion of the trial or the
disposition of the case without trial.
Pretrial Motions
The publicity attendant upon criminal proceed-
ings may result in a motion by defendant or by the
state for a change of venue or a continuance, or in
an attempt by defendant to waive trial by jury.
In many states, the practice has been to defer
ruling on a motion for change of venue or con-
tinuance until after the empaneling of the jury, on
the theory that the voir dire examination will
reveal whether there is sufficient prejudice to
require that the motion be granted. In recognition
of the difficult position in which defense counsel is
thus placed and of the difficulty, if not impossi-
bility, of reaching through voir dire examination
prejudices subconsciously harbored by jurors, the
ABA Standards 9 recommend that a motion made
before empaneling should be disposed of before
empaneling, and that a motion made or recon-
sidered after empaneling should not be denied
because a jury has been empaneled, if it appears
from the record that there is a reasonable likelihood
that, if the motion is not granted, a fair trial
cannot be held. The Standards recommend also"
that the determination whether there is such a
likelihood be based on such evidence as qualified
public opinion surveys or opinion testimony of
individuals (which however are not required as a
condition of granting the motion), or on the
court's own evaluation of the nature, frequency
20 3.1(d).
2 3.1(b) & (c).
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and timing of the publicity in question, and that
a showing of actual prejudice shall not be required.
Those recommendations have been approved by
the Supreme Court of California.n Except as
appellate court decisions in his state mandate his
doing otherwise, a trial judge hearing a motion
for change of venue or continuance, should con-
sider those recommendations in reaching his
conclusion.
In some states the right of a defendant to waive
trial by jury is absolute; in others, there is in
certain types of cases no right to waive; in still
others, the consent of the prosecutor is required;
still others require the approval of the court with
or without the consent of the prosecutor. With the
possible exception of the case in which the de-
fendant's reasons for wanting a bench trial are so
compelling that the prosecutor's insistence upon
jury trial can be considered denial of an impartial
trial, the prosecutor's refusal of consent must be
respected.n When the prosecutor consents, or
when under the law of the particular state his
consent is not required, the criteria governing
whether the trial judge should permit the waiver
because of publicity claimed to be prejudicial are
(1) whether the waiver has been made knowingly
and voluntarily, and (2) whether there is reason to
believe, based on evaluation of the publicity
involved, that permitting the waiver will increase
the likelihood of a fair trial.24
Grand Jury Transcripts
In most states grand jury proceedings are secret,
and the grand jury transcript is available only to
the state and, at certain stages of the proceeding,
to the defendant on order of the court. In some
states, however, the statute requires secrecy only
until defendant is in custody.2 1 In such a state,
the trial judge should consider whether an order
should not be made directing the stenographer
not to release to any persons other than the
prosecutor and the defendant any portion of the
transcript containing evidence that may be
excluded at the trial (e.g., a confession). 2'
Exhibits
Under the circumstances of a particular case, an
order impounding exhibits or proscribing the
21 Maine v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 438
P.2d 372 (1968).
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965).
2 See ABA STaNARD 3.3.2-1E.g., CAL PENAL CoDE §938.1.
26 See Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d
234, 1 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
photographing of exhibits or both may be neces-
sary.2
Names and Addresses of Prospective Jurors
The publication of the names and addresses of
prospective jurors and of those persons empaneled
as the trial jury, and their consequent exposure to
telephone calls and letters, both anonymous and
from friends, expressing opinion concerning
defendant's guilt, is twice commented upon in the
Sheppard decision28 and the necessity for assuring
that the addresses, and perhaps even the names, of
the empaneled jurors, be held in confidence in
order to protect the integrity of the trial was
stated in United States v. Borelli.2" On the other
hand, the Supreme Court of Illinois directed30 in
the Speck case, in which the jurors were to be se-
questered, that "the names of prospective jurors
not to be reported until such individuals are either
excused or sworn as jurymen and sequestered",
apparently leaving in effect that part of the trial
court's order which directed that jurors' addresses
not be released until after verdict. The trial judge
should, therefore, protect the privacy of jurors,
prospective and selected, by directing (1) that
court personnel not release the names and ad-
dresses of prospective jurors; (2) that in the selec-
tion process the address of a prospective juror be
furnished counsel in writing but not be stated by
counsel or the prospective juror during the selec-
tion process, and not be released by counsel or
court personnel until after verdict, whether the
jurors are sequestered or not; and, perhaps (3)
when jurors are not to be sequestered, similarly
holding the names of selected jurors in confidence.
However, as a practical matter in a trial of any
length it may be almost impossible to prevent
identification by someone interested in ascertain-
ing identity. In those states in which the proce-
dure is to publicize the names of the entire panel
of veniremen as soon as it is drawn, the trial judge
will have to consider on what authority that is
done and its effect on the fairness of the particular
trial.
Use of Courtroom and Courthouse Facilities
The public interest in sensational trials fur-
nishes no basis for moving a trial to a theatre or
"I See discussion in text, supra at 290.
28 Supra note 2, at 342.
29336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub. norn.
Cinquegrano v. United States, 379 U.S. 960 (1964).
0 The unreported order was made in an original
proceeding entitled People ec rel. The Tribune Co. v.
Paschen, No. 40507, Ill. Sup. Ct., March 1, 1967.
[Vol. 60
TRIAL JUDGE'S GUIDE-NEWS REPORTING AND FAIR TRIALS
other similar accommodation outside the court-
house,3' though it would not be improper to
schedule the trial for the largest courtroom in the
courthouse if in the discretion of the trial judge
doing so would not sacrifice the judicial serenity
and calm to which a person accused is entitled.
"[A] trial is public, in the constitutional sense,
when a courtroom has facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings,
which facilities are not so small as to render the
openness negligible and not so large as to distract
the trial participants from their proper function,
when the public is free to use those facilities, and
when all those who attend the trial are free to
report what they observed at the proceedings." 32
Both the courtroom and the courthouse are
subject to control by the court. The area within
the bar of the courtroom must be kept clear of
spectators and newsmen so that counsel, parties
and witnesses can confer in confidence, and to
assure that exhibits not be handled by unauthor-
ized persons. Outside the bar, available seats
should be divided on a reasonable basis between
spectators and newsmen, and within the area
allocated to news representatives specific seat
assignments should be made. In some cases, more
news representatives may wish to attend than
there are seats available, and in some cases a
system of credentials for newsmen may make
easier their movement in and out of the courtroom.
While there is authority to limit the number of
news representatives in the courtroom and to
establish some reasonable identification system
for them, any assignment of facilities, whether in
or out of the courtroom, should be on an equitable
basis. In this connection and in ascertaining what
media representatives wish to be present, the trial
judge may obtain invaluable assistance from the
local Bar-Press Committee, or from representa-
tives of local associations of journalists and broad-
casters.
In most states, the taking of photographs in the
courtroom, during sessions or during recess, or the
broadcasting or televising of trials is prohibited,
and in many states the taking of photographs
anywhere in a courthouse at any time is proscribed.
Some newsmen may not be aware of that fact,
however, and the judge's order should, therefore,
bring the matter to their attention. Where state
procedure permits the taking of photographs in, or
broadcasting or televising from, the courtroom (1)
31 Estes v. Texas, supra note 1, at 572-73.
AId. at 584.
television should never be permitted without
defendant's consent,33 and (2) the trial judge must
establish and enforce "ground rules" concerning
when, where, and with respect to what the equip-
ment may be used, in order to assure that it does
not become such a disruptive influence as to
amount to a denial of due process.34 He might
consider requiring that one "pool" photographer
be agreed upon to serve all the media.
Sketch artists are sometimes employed by the
media where cameras are not permitted. There
should be no blanket prohibition against such
artists since their product is simply a pictorial
rather than a verbal method of reporting what
took place. On the other hand, an artist who works
at an easel may distract the jury or unnerve a
witness, or available space may be limited. While
some judges have entered orders barring them,
the objective of an orderly trial can be achieved by
specifying that the artist must work in a seated
position and without an easel. If so many requests
are received that the number of artists would
cause distraction, the court might require the use
of a "pool" artist.
The use of other courthouse facilities should
likewise be dealt with by order. There is no obliga-
tion on the court to provide extra facilities, but
neither is there reason to make the newsmen's
work more difficult. Thus, if there is a press room
in the courthouse, there is no reason to forbid
installation of additional phones, or, when it can
be done without disruption of court functions, to
prohibit a telephone company trailer with addi-
tional phones to be parked on court grounds. The
cardinal principles are that press facilities should
not be close to the jury room or bring newsmen
into close contact with jurors, that the corridors be
kept clear so that other courts can function
properly and decorum be maintained, and that
any facilities made available be allocated equitably
among newsmen.
Newsmen should be aware, before the trial
begins, of what they can expect and what is ex-
pected of them. Accordingly, the order should
cover not only the matters so far considered, but
also how media representatives should conduct
themselves in the courtroom. Since movement by a
large number of people within or in and out of the
courtroom may be distracting, the court may wish
to suggest that movement be kept to an absolute
minimum. Alternatively the court may direct that
m Estes v. Texas, supra note 1.
4Ibid.; Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 2.
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no one be permitted to enter or leave, except in an
emergency, while the court is in session, but if that
is done, an effort should be made to find out what
deadlines media representatives must meet and to
arrange recesses, so far as feasible, with those
deadlines in mind. Copies of the order should be
delivered in advance of the trial to each newsman
who seeks to attend.
CoNDUcT or THE TRiAL
Sequestering Jurors
Sequestration is, if properly carried out, the
most effective means of shielding jurors from
extraneous prejudicial matter appearing in news-
papers or on radio or television during the trial
and, in some cases, may be the answer to the
problems usually arising from exclusionary hear-
ings. It is a matter the trial judge should raise sua
sponte with counsel.35 Though it involves expense
for the state and inconvenience for the jurors and
may make it more difficult to obtain a jury, and
for these reasons should not be routinely ordered,
it should be ordered whenever it appears likely
that, unless the jurors are sequestered, highly
prejudicial matter may come to their attention.
To be effective, however, sequestration requires
more than simply confining the jurors to a guarded
hotel area or in some public facility. It requires
also that newspapers that jurors are allowed to see
be scanned and prejudicial matter excised, that
radio and television be kept from the jurors or
monitored so that news broadcasts concerning the
case can be excluded, that records be kept of which
jurors receive mail and telephone calls and that the
mail be censored and the calls be listened in on by
a court employee, that newspapers be excluded
from the courtroom and other areas where jurors
may in passing see a prejudicial headline, and that
contact between jurors and newsmen not be
permitted. In view of the substantial incursions on
juror privacy and convenience, the jurors should
be told that sequestration is intended to shield
them from harrassment and to preclude direct or
indirect communications to them that might
disadvantage either side. They should not be told
at whose instance, unless it be at the instance of
the court, sequestration has been ordered.
Selection of Jurors
As noted above,3" the addresses of prospective
jurors should not be stated during the selection
35 Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 2, at 363.36 Text, supra at 292.
process nor released until verdict, and when jurors
are not sequestered it may also be proper to hold
in confidence the names of the jurors selected.
Examination of prospective jurors as to pretrial
publicity of a potentially prejudicial nature should
be conducted individually, outside the presence of
other prospective or selected jurors. The purpose
of the examination is to ascertain what publicity
each prospective juror has seen or heard or heard
about and what effect it has had on his ability to
judge the case impartially." The questions,
whether by judge or attorney, should seek only to
ascertain the juror's exposure and state of mind,
not to convince him that he should be able to
cast aside preconceptions. Determination of the
juror's acceptability is the responsibility of the
trial judge in ruling on challenges for cause. In
making that determination, the judge is not
bound by the juror's answers. A juror who states
that he has formed an opinion but that he will be
able to decide impartially should nonetheless be
excused if the publicity which he recalls is of a
highly inflammatory natureE or concerns in-
criminatory matter of significance (e.g., confession,
identification, prior criminal record) that may be
inadmissible in evidence. A juror who states that
he will be unable to overcome his preconceptions
should be excused though his exposure has been
slight. A juror who has been exposed only to
information that will be introduced during the
trial or which, though possibly inadmissible,
creates no substantial risk of prejudice should be
seated if the judge concludes that, though the
prospective juror admits to having formed an
opinion, he can decide the case impartially. Any
doubt should, however, be resolved against
acceptability.
If the panel from which the trial jury is to be
selected is of sufficient size that it is reasonable to
expect selection to be completed without addi-
tional veniremen being called, examination of
prospective jurors should proceed in open court.
The entire panel should be cautioned before the
selection process begins that so long as there is any
possibility of his being selected as a trial juror in
the particular case no juror should read, watch or
listen to newspaper, radio or television broadcasts
concerning the case. If, however, the size of the
panel and the nature of the pretrial publicity
make it likely that more than one panel will have
37 See ABA STNDAnn 3.4; Silverthorne v. United
States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968).
"$See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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to be drawn before selection of the trial jury is
completed, the trial judge may find it necessary to
exclude the public, including media representa-
tives, from the courtroom during the selection
process so that the impartiality of those who may
be drawn as additional veniremen will not be
disturbed by reading, hearing or seeing reports
concerning the examination of prospective jurors
with respect to pretrial publicity. Whether the
selection process takes place in open court or in
dosed session, a verbatim record of the voir dire
examination should be made for appeal purposes.
If selection occurs during dosed session, the
transcript should be released, and the media
advised of its release, immediately after verdict if
the trial jury is not sequestered, or immediately
after the selection is completed if the jury is then
sequestered.
Extrajudicial Statements; Exhibits; Use of
Courtroom and Courthouse Facilities
What has been written earlier with respect to
these topics"9 applies as well to the period of trial.
Cautioning Jurors
If the jury is not to be sequestered, they must
be cautioned, dearly and firmly, against (1)
reading newspaper accounts, or listening to or
watching any radio or television broadcast, about
the trial, (2) discussing the case with anyone, or
permitting any interview by a newsman on any
subject during the course of the trial. At the end
of each day's session and at other recesses, as
appropriate, the jurors should be reminded of
those admonitions. A pattern instruction with
respect to newspaper, radio and television ac-
counts of the case is set forth in 3.5(e) of the
ABA Standards. Furthermore, the jurors should
not be permitted to take newspapers with them
into the jury room.40
In many states, trial jurors (as distinct from
grand jurors) are not required to maintain secrecy
concerning jury deliberations once the verdict is in.
The trial judge should advise the jurors, after they
have returned their verdict, what the law of his
state is on the subject. If disclosure is permitted,
he should also advise the jurors that they are not
required to discuss the case with anyone, that
their deliberations are carried out in the secrecy
of the jury room to permit the utmost freedom of
debate between jurors and so that each juror can
39 Text, supra at 289, 292-294.40 Silverthome v. United States, supra note 37.
express his views without fear of public scorn or
the anger of the defendant or any public official,
and that in deciding whether to answer questions
concerning the case, and if so what to disclose,
they should have in mind their own interests and
the interests of the other members of the jury.
Questioning Jurors About Publicity Occurring
During Trial
When it comes or is brought to the court's
attention that material which goes beyond the
evidence presented to the jury and which may
seriously disturb its impartiality may have
reached some or all of the jurors, the court should
question each such juror, separately and out of the
presence of any other jurors, about his exposure to
the material. Such an inquiry should be made on
motion of the state, of the accused, or on the
court's own motion. The state has the burden,
with respect to publicity from which prejudice
might arise, of showing that defendant's rights
have not been prejudiced.4' Moreover, since the
state has that burden, the fact that defendant
declines the court's offer to question the jurors
concerning the publicity does not, it appears,
obviate the necessity for the inquiry.4' While the
inquiry should be conducted by the trial judge,
and should be held in camera to assure frankness
on the part of the juror in answering questions
and to prevent further prejudice to defendant
through media reports of the questioning,4
counsel must be permitted to be present and to
suggest lines of inquiry to the judge if they so
desire, and a verbatim transcript must be kept for
purposes of appeal. The basis for excusing a juror
who has been exposed to such publicity is the same
as the standard of acceptability with respect to
opinions formed on the basis of pre-trial publicity,4
except that if the publicity is such that a mistrial
would have to be declared if it had been referred
to during trial, a juror who has seen or heard it
should be excused. In proceeding on its own
motion or ruling on a motion by the state, the
court should, however, bear in mind that if the
excusal of jurors reduces the number of jurors to
less than twelve a mistrial must be declared
(absent defendant's consent to a jury of less than
twelve). A mistrial at that stage, without defend-
ant's express consent, unless unequivocally in
41 Ibd.42Ibid.
43Id. at 644; Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d
504, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cerl. denied, 368 U.S. 855
(1961).44 Discussed in text, supra at 294.
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defendant's interest, may on the principle of double
jeopardy, preclude a retrial.4 5
Trial Transcript
Newsmen often purchase a copy of the trial
transcript in order to assure the accuracy of their
reporting,48 and since what transpires in the
courtroom is public property, it is dear that they
should be permitted to do so. The only situation in
which newspaper reports of testimony, either
verbatim or in narrative form can present a trial
difficulty is when witnesses have been excluded
from the courtroom during trial. That situation
may, however, by dealt with by sequestering the
witnesses,4 7 and is no reason for denying to news-
men the right to purchase a copy of the transcript.
The transcript available to newsmen, however,
is only that of proceedings in open court. The trial
judge should, therefore, establish with the court
reporter some procedure that will insure that in
the rush of preparing daily copy the reporter does
not inadvertently release the transcript of closed
portions of the trial. The mechanics of the system
should be agreed upon in advance of trial and
incorporated in a court order so that the court
reporters clearly understand their obligations and
newsmen will be aware exactly what will be
available to them.
Taped transcription of what transpires in the
courtroom generally should not be permitted,
however, in view of the noise and space problems
they may present and the psychological problem
for witnesses that may be created by the presence
of tape recorders,5 and of the added, and often
more dramatic, emphasis that may be given by
the broadcast media through the isolated use of
the more sensational portions of such a tape.49
Hearings Out of the Presence of the Jury
What has been stated above50 with respect to
pretrial hearings applies as well to hearings,
whether of witnesses or of attorneys' arguments,
held during the trial out of the presence of the
jury, if the jury has not been sequestered. If the
trial judge determines that the evidence to be ad-
45 Compare Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d 805(10th Cir. 1967) and People ex rel. Totalis v. Craver,
174 Misc. 325, 20 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1940), with Gori v.
United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
4'See Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 2, at 620.
4 See text, infra at 296.
48 See Estes v. Texas, supra note 1.49 Ibid.
60 Text, supra at 290-291.
duced or the argument to be made at such hearing
is likely to interfere with the defendant's right to
fair trial, then on defendant's motion, or with
defendant's consent, the trial should be closed to
the public including representatives of the news
media, and the judge should, on the record,
caution those present against disclosing prior
to conclusion of the case specified information
adduced during the closed hearing. Whenever a
dosed hearing is held a verbatim transcript should
be kept and that transcript should be released, and
newsmen informed of its release, promptly after
the disposition of the case.
Witnesses and Parties
A defendant in a criminal proceeding has the
right to be present during all proceedings, whether
in open or closed session. Witnesses may, however,
be excluded from the courtroom, so that one
witness cannot tailor his testimony to that of a
preceding witness. When a witness is barred and
that portion of the trial from which he is excluded
extends beyond one day, he should be sequestered
since there is no other way of assuring that he will
not learn through news reporting what the preced-
ing witness' testimony was.
Either a witness or a party may, however, be
ordered by the court not to grant interviews or
make extrajudicial statements to news media
representatives during trial," and either a witness
or a party may be ordered by the court not to
disclose testimony given at a dosed hearing.
FoRm or Tim COURT ORDERS
What is required is not one but several different
orders, some of which can be addressed to more
than one group or include more than one subject;
others will be addressed to a particular group or
individual. Some, like the direction to a witness
testifying at a closed hearing, may be stated orally
on the record, but most should be prepared in
writing and formally served on the persons who
are intended to be governed by them.
The many varying fact situations that may be
met make it impractical to suggest specific word-
ing. Some general suggestions can, however, be
offered. First, the temptation to adopt the form of
order used in some prior sensational murder trial
(e.g., the Sheppard, Coppolino, Speck, Sirlan
trials) should be resisted, in light of the differences
1' Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 2, at 359, 361,
363.
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in the constitutional, statutory and decisional law
of the various states and of the embryonic state of
federal constitutional law on the subject now and
at the time they were drafted.
Secondly, each order should be tailored to the
particular case. While the conduct of attorneys
and others subject to judicial control may be
regulated by special court order or rule,u there is
some question concerning the validity of a general
injunction addressed to law enforcement officials
as well as attorneys and intended to apply to all
cases in a given county."
Thirdly, though the judge should warn newsmen
of the impropriety of, and the possibility that
reversal may result from, publishing material not
introduced in evidence at the trial, it is far from
dear that such a warning can be made the basis of
a contempt proceeding even though the news
report concerns something that occurred outside
the courtroom, and it seems clear that it cannot be
if the news report is about something that occurred
in open court." There is little value, therefore, in
repeating in the order (as some of the orders made
in recent sensational cases have done) precatory
language from the Sheppard opinion "5 that the
news media must be "content with the task of
reporting the case as it unfolded in the courtroom-
not pieced together from extrajudicial statements."
More effective will be to state in any such warning
the specific material referred to (e.g., prior criminal
record), accompanying the statement with an
explanation of the effect publication may have on
juror impartiality and a request for cooperation.
Even such a specific statement will furnish a basis
for contempt only in limited situations,55 but it is
much more likely to result in cooperation than will
a general one.
Fourthly, the order should not be unnecessarily
restrictive. It should incorporate only provisions
that are reasonably necessary to maintain decorum
and obviate prejudice and which the court expects
to enforce. As already noted, though the making
of sketches is subject to limitation, absolute
exclusion of a sketch artist may not be necessary.
52 Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 2.
3See text, supra at 288-89; and see County of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 670, 62
Cal. Rptr. 435, (1967) hearing deded, 62 Cal. Rptr. 449
(Sup. Ct.) (1967).
5See MEDimA REPORT 46-47; Phoenix Newspapers
Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594
(1966); Shaw v. Commonwealth, 238 N.E.2d 876 (Mass.
1968).
55 384 U.S. at 362.
56 See text, infra at 297.
Some orders have required that everyone entering
the courtroom be searched. There may, of course,
be cases involving such high community feeling
that search is necessary as a security measure, to
prevent escape or possible violence in the court-
room. But if the purpose is to exclude cameras and
recording devices, a sign at the courtroom en-
trance so stating should be sufficient, at least
until there is some indication to the contrary.
Some orders have proscribed particular activities,
such as the taking of photographs, not only in the
courtroom or the courthouse but in parking or
other areas adjacent to the courthouse. While
picketing or other coercive activity outside the
courthouse may be proscribed,67 neither decorum
of the trial nor protection against prejudice
necessitate an order prohibiting the taking of
photographs beyond the confines of the courthouse
itself.
The desirability of bringing the specific orders
directed to newsmen to their attention in advance
of trial has been noted. They should also be
furnished with copies of orders directed to jurors,
parties, attorneys, law enforcement officials, so
that they will be aware of the limitations on what
each of those classes of persons may release.2 With
respect to witnesses and jurors, provision should
be made for service of a copy of the governing
order with the subpoena, and with respect to
parties, attorneys and law enforcement personnel,
personal service of the order should be made.
CONTEMPT
With respect to any party, attorney, witness or
juror who violates a valid court order of which he
is aware, contempt proceedings are available.
With respect to attorneys, disciplinary proceed-
ings might also be proper. With respect to law
enforcement and other governmental personnel,
unless separation of powers makes the underlying
court order invalid, contempt is available, and
there may also be departmental disciplinary
proceedings.
With respect to newsmen, however, the Supreme
Court in the Sheppard case" noted its unwilling-
ness "to place any direct limitations on the free-
dom traditionally exercised by the news media."
Therefore, contempt proceedings should not be
taken against a newsman who reports statements
5Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
&3 See text, at 296.
59 384 U.S. at 350.
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made to him by others, unless it can be proven (1)
that his purpose in reporting the statement was
deliberately to sabotage the trial 0 or (2) that
6oSee ABA STADARD 4.1(a)--"...wilfully de-
signed by that person to affect the outcome of the
trial;" and see Worcester Telegram & Gazette, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, Mass. (68), 238 N.E.2d 861 (1968).
While such situations are rare, they do occur. See, for
example, Newsweek's report concerning the second
trial of Thomas Wansley:
"At the retrial in mid-March, the two papers con-
stantly reprinted details of the first trial, referred
to defense assertions as innuendo and repeatedly
identified Wansley's New York lawyer, William
M. Kunstler, as having 'been linked on numerous
knowing that the person from whom he received
the information was under court order not to
disclose the information, he nevertheless procured
that person to violate the order. In the latter
situation what is punished is the newsman's
subornation of his informant's contempt, not the
newsman's publication of the data thus obtained,
and there should, therefore, be no constitutional
problem involved in the use in such a situation of
the contempt power.
occasions to Communist-front organizations and
efforts'."
Newsweek, May 8, 1967, at 88.
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